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Numerous empirical studies have shown that voters respond to economic conditions. These 
studies typically focus on national or individual level economic conditions.
1 Only a handful of 
studies have estimated responses to local economic conditions. This is surprising for two 
reasons. First, a large theoretical literature uses the assumption that voters are sensitive to 
local  economic  conditions  and,  second,  estimates  of  responses  to  other  levels  may  be 
misleading if the responses to local level variables are substantial. 
This paper improves the understanding of voting behavior by presenting a detailed analysis 
of responses to two dif ferent  local  levels  of  economic  conditions.  In  particular,  voters‟ 
responses  to  municipality  and  regional  level  unemployment  and  economic  growth  are 
estimated using data from six Swedish general elections between 1985 and 2002 covering 284 
municipalities. 
It is not a novel idea that voters consider local economic conditions when deciding whether 
to support the government or vote for the opposition. Models by e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1993)  and  Dixit  and  Londregan  (1996)  suggest  that  governments  tactically  redistribute 
resources  to  regions  with  many  swing  voters.  Cox  and  McCubbins  (1986)  argue  that 
politicians redistribute to regions where they have many supporters and Weingast et al. (1981) 
discuss how political effort and spending may be geographically uneven (and inefficient) if 
politicians favor their own constituencies. These models all assume that voters are sensitive to 
the amount of resources spent in their area and that resources are geographically unevenly 
redistributed. 
A few empirical studies have found that voters respond to regional spending. Levitt and 
Snyder (1997) show that the outcomes of U.S. House elections are influenced by federal 
spending  and  Jordahl  (2002)  shows  that  voters  respond  to  specific  grants  to  Swedish 
municipalities from the national government. These tests have focused on spending rather 
than  measures  of  economic  outcomes.  Funds  come  in  a  variety  of  forms  and  may  have 
different effects on unemployment and economic growth. In this paper, I take a more general 
approach to this problem by estimating the impact of economic growth and unemployment, at 
local levels, on the support for the national government. 
Knowing whether voters respond in systematic ways to economic conditions at local levels 
is important for understanding how voters respond to national and individual level economic 
conditions  as  well.  Omitting  local  level  variables  may  result  in  misspecified  models  and 
misleading estimates and conclusions. Earlier studies, only including national and individual 
level economic indicators, may therefore be missing important aspects of voting behavior.  
Johnston and Pattie (2001) address this issue by including a local level in their analysis of 
the British general election of 1997, arguing that such an intermediate level is necessary for 
understanding voting behavior. They estimate the effect of individual, local, and national level 
economic  conditions  on  individual  voting  behavior.  Their  study  uses  survey  data  on 
individuals‟ perceptions of economic conditions, and finds that voters are less influenced by 
perceptions of changes in national level economic prosperity than by perceptions of changes 
                                           
1 For surveys of the economic voting literature, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
(2000) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994). 3 
 
in  the  prosperity  of  their  local  area.  They  also  find  that  the  prosperity  of  the  local  area 
influences voting behavior more than changes in the personal financial situation.  
In a related study, Auberger and Dubois (2005) find that local economic circumstances 
play an important role in forecasting election outcomes in French legislative elections, using a 
measure of labor market performance as an indicator of local economic conditions. The aim 
of their study is mainly to make accurate predictions of election outcomes, while the aim of 
this  paper  is  to  understand  at  which  levels  voters  respond  to  real  changes  in  objective 
economic  conditions.  Furthermore,  a  key  difference  between  the  French  and  Swedish 
parliaments  is  that  in  the  French  National  Assembly,  representatives  administrate  local 
territories,  while  representatives  in  the  Swedish  Riksdag  do  not  have  such  a  clear  local 
connection. This raises the question of whether local economic conditions have an impact on 
the  vote  also  for  political  systems  where  national  politicians  do  not  have  a  direct 
responsibility for specific local areas.  
Among other things, Leigh (2005) investigates how neighborhood characteristics influence 
citizens‟ partisan choice in Australian elections and finds that living in a richer neighborhood 
increases the probability of voting for the right-wing party. While that study focuses on a 
left−right choice, this paper focuses on a government−opposition choice. 
Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) ask a number of questions regarding voting in the United 
States.  One  question  they  try  to  answer  is  whether  local  economic  conditions  are  of 
importance in U.S. presidential elections. They find that county-level economic conditions 
have a small impact on the election outcomes relative to state and national level economic 
variables. The results  are not  so  surprising,  given the  great  vertical  distance between the 
national (federal) and the county level in the United States. This also makes it hard to draw 
any inference from this study to much smaller European countries. 
Veiga and Veiga (2008) find that national economic conditions play a role in national 
elections in Portugal. Interestingly, they also find some influences of economic conditions at 
the municipality level. 
Johnston and Pattie (2001), Auberger and Dubois (2005), Leigh (2005), and Veiga and 
Veiga (2008) all indicate that economic conditions between the national and the individual 
level influence how citizens vote.  
Although the questions asked in Johnston and Pattie‟s (2001) study and in this paper are 
similar, a few differences are worth being pointed out. First, Johnston and Pattie analyze only 
one election, whereas I use data from six elections with much more variation in government 
performance. This also allows me to use a difference approach which effectively reduces the 
bias stemming from omitted variables.  
While Johnston and Pattie use subjective perceptions of economic conditions and survey 
responses  to  how  the  respondents  have  voted,  I  use  objective  measures  of  economic 
conditions and real voting data. This avoids problems associated with measurement error and 
non-response  in  survey  data.  A  possible  advantage  of  their  approach  is  that  they  use 
individual level data and perceptions of economic conditions. This also has some drawbacks, 
however.  Since  their  respondents  are  asked  to  answer  how  their  part  of  the  country  has 
developed, two problems arise.
2 First, the respondents may differ in the size of the area they 
                                           
2 The question used by Johnston and Pattie (2001) to measure perceptions of local economic development is: 
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consider. Second, even if the respondents have concordant perceptions of what they mean 
with this part of Britain, the researcher does not know if most people are referring to the 
village they live in or if they think of regions with many millions of people. I avoid these 
problems  by  using  economic  variables  at  well  defined  levels  of  aggregation,  viz. 
municipalities and regions based on the area covered by the regional news, as broadcasted by 
Swedish public television. 
Another  well-known  problem  of  using  subjective  perceptions  of  economic  changes  as 
explanatory variables is that a large proportion of the variation may be unrelated to variation 
in their objective counterparts. As a consequence, estimates based on subjective perceptions 
may suffer from a severe attenuation bias, thus making it difficult to know if real changes in 
the objective variables influence voting decisions (Kramer, 1983). Subjective perceptions of 
economic conditions have also been shown to be related to many confounding factors such as 
political attitudes, education and media exposure (Duch et al., 2000), making it even more 
difficult to know how real economic changes affect the support of the incumbent government. 
For  further  discussions  on  these  questions,  see  e.g.  Kramer  (1983),  Kirchgässner  (1991), 
Nannestad  and  Paldam  (1997),  and  Duch  et  al.  (2000).  Although  voters  must  base  their 
decisions on their perceptions of economic conditions, it may be more interesting to know 
how they respond to real economic conditions. 
This  paper  improves  on  the  existing  literature  on  the  influences  of  local  economic 
conditions  by  analyzing  responses  to  objective  measures  of  economic  conditions  at  two 
different local levels, using panel data covering six elections. In addition, I expose the results 
to extensive robustness tests. Furthermore, previous analyses of responses to local economic 
conditions have used British, French, Portuguese, Australian, and American data, but no study 
has investigated Swedish data. 
The  empirical  results  of  this  paper  indicate  substantial  responses  to  local  level  economic 
conditions. The preferred specification suggests that a reduction in regional unemployment by 
one percentage point is associated with an increase in the support for the national government 
by about 1.7 percentage points. The effect of growth, at the regional level, is substantial in 
size, but statistically insignificant. At the municipality level, unemployment seems to have a 
smaller effect than at the regional level and growth has no effect on government support. 
 Exposing the model to extensive robustness tests provides further insights, but does not 
change the main conclusion that voters respond to local level economic conditions. 
2. Theoretical background 
In addition to the papers by Weingast et al. (1981) and Dixit and Londregan (1996), which 
directly  suggest  that  support  for  the  government  may  be  influenced  by  local  economic 
conditions, there are many models of voting and political behavior that also suggest that local 
economic conditions may be important.  
The economic voting literature builds on early contributions by Downs (1957) and Key 
(1966). They both argue that voters hold the incumbent government responsible for economic 
conditions in the sense that they reward a government that has been successful in its economic 
policies by reelecting it. Downs (1957) motivated this retrospective economic voting theory 
with the observation that the policies of political parties tend to be rather stable over time. 
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Models of rational retrospective voting have been formalized by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1990), showing that past outcomes of economic variables can be used 
as signals of the economic competence of the government. 
Economic models of voting typically assume that voters are selfish
3, while many political 
scientists instead argue that voters have altruistic voting motives. However, it is hard to test to 
what degree voters are selfish or altruistic. Empirical studies typically suggest that voters 
respond to national level indicators of economic conditions,  while only a few find important 
responses  to  microeconomic  conditions.
4  Responses  to  macroeconomic  conditions  are, 
however, consistent both with altruistic concerns and selfish motives. For example, a voter 
that responds to macroeconomic variables may do s o because she believes it to be a good 
indicator  of  how  her  own  personal  financial  situation  will  develop  if  the  incumbent 
government is reelected, or because she is concerned about the economic situation of all 
citizens in the country. Furthermore, Brennan and Lomasky (1993) argue that citizens who are 
otherwise selfish may very well express altruism when casting their vote. The reason is that 
the cost of altruistic voting is negligible since the probability of affecting the outcome of the 
election is very small. 
As shown by the discussion, no theoretical consensus of why citizens vote as they do has 
been reached and the empirical literature has not been able to clearly discriminate between the 
models. Most of the models do, however, suggest that citizens b ase their voting decisions at 
least partly on the success of the government‟s economic policy. 
Few of the models discussed above explicitly suggest on which economic indicators voters 
should base their decision and none of them seem to conflict with the hypothesis that voters 
also consider local economic conditions. Some of them may actually work better with local 
economic  indicators  since  voters  who  are  purely  selfish  may  find  that  local  economic 
conditions  could  be  more  useful  in  predicting  personal  financial  outcomes  than  national 
economic conditions. Altruistic voters may, on the other hand, care relatively more about 
people living closer to them and, therefore, also have reasons to consider local economic 
conditions. In line with this, I specify the econometric model so as to allow voters to respond 
to  past  economic  conditions  at  two  different  local  levels.  The  aim  is  not  to  discriminate 
between the different models but purely to investigate the empirical relationships between 
economic conditions at local levels and government support. 
3. Institutional and geographical settings 
The Swedish political system is organized into three levels: municipalities, counties and the 
national level. All levels set and collect taxes as well as supply services to citizens. The 
municipalities supply services such as primary and secondary education, child care, and social 
assistance, while the main task of the counties is to supply medical service. Elections, at all 
levels, were held on the same day every three years from 1970 until 1994, and every four 
years since 1994. 
                                           
3However, there are models that do not rely on this assumption. In papers by, for example, Blomquist and 
Christiansen (1999), and Dixit and Londregan (1998) citizens that are allowed to have altruistic preferences vote 
over the supply of publicly provided private goods and redistribution. 
4 For a review, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994). Examples of papers 
finding responses to macroeconomi c variables are: Kramer (1971), Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) and Markus 
(1988). Examples of papers finding responses to microeconomic variables are: Nannestad and Paldam (1997), 
Markus (1988) and Jordahl (2006). 6 
 
The  focus  of  this  study  is  on  the  general  election,  i.e.  the  election  to  the  Swedish 
parliament.
5 A proportional system is used to allocate seats in parliament, which then appoints 
a Prime Minister to form a  government. The government can consist of a single party or a 
coalition of parties and the parties are usually divided into a left - and a center-right bloc. 
During the time period for this analysis, the  center-right bloc formed a coalition government 
between 1991 and 1994 and the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna) ruled as a 
minority government during five terms (1982-1991 and 1994-2002). The Social Democratic 
Party has generally been supported by the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet). For extended per iods, 
the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) and the Cente r Party (Centerpartiet) also cooperated with the 
Social Democratic Party, and other parties have, at times, lent the Social Democratic Party 
pivotal support on specific issues. 
It is natural to investigate responses to municipality-level economic conditions, as these are 
likely to have a direct impact on the well -being of many citizens. It is also likely that many 
voters are well informed about the economic conditions in their own municipality, since many 
sources for that kind of information are available, such as local newspapers and regular 
interactions  with  other  people  in  the  municipality.
6  Whether  voters  hold  the  central 
government responsible for the municipal economic conditions is, however, less clear  and 
will be investigated in this paper. In 1990, 90 percent of the municipalities had a population of 
between 6,000 and 88,000 citizens. The municipality of Stockholm (the capital of Sweden) 
clearly stands out in this dimension with almost 700,000 citizen s. As the capital of Sweden, 
Stockholm is different from other municipalities also in many other dimensions. For instance, 
as virtually all media in Sweden report on the economic conditions in Stockholm, people 
living in Stockholm are likely to have more a ccurate information about the economic 
conditions in their municipality than what other citizens have about their home municipalities. 
Many people live in one municipality and work in another. Figures from Statistics Sweden 
show that an average of 24 percent of the working population works in another municipality 
than the one in which they live. In 10 percent of the municipalities, this share was above 50 
percent. Substantial commuting indicates that people may be affected by economic conditions 
in municipalities  other  than their home municipality. This observation also motivates the 
investigation of voting responses to regional economic conditions. 
Ideally, one would like regions to be sufficiently large so that the economic conditions in 
the municipalities may differ from those of the region. One would also like the region to be a 
natural region in the sense that citizens have common perceptions of what constitutes the 
region. Furthermore, it is important that citizens can easily obtain information about economic 
conditions in the region. 
One type of region that meets the above criteria is the regions defined by the coverage 
areas  of  „the  regional  news‟  (Regionala  nyheter).  Swedish  public  television  (Sveriges 
Television AB) broadcasts regional news on a daily basis and has done so during the entire 
period covered in this paper. The regional news is an important source of information about 
the regional economy. Every day, about ten percent of the population  watch the regional 
                                           
5 Several studies have shown that economic voting plays an important role in Sweden; for a brief survey of these 
studies see Jordahl (2006).  
6 Daily newspapers are an important source of information in Sweden. Annual estimates from 1986 to 2001 
show that between 80 and 90 percent of the adult populati on read a daily newspaper at least five days per week 
(Antoni and Eriksson, 2002). Near all of the about 170 daily newspapers in Sweden have a local connection and 
serve one or a few municipalities, devoting a substantial part of the newspaper to local news.  7 
 
news.  This  means  that  citizens  within  each  region  have  a  common  important  source  of 
information concerning the economic situation of the region. During the period of study, nine 
different  programs  were  broadcasted,  each  covering  a  geographically  connected  area 
consisting of a specified set of municipalities. This makes the coverage areas of the regional 
news natural areas to use as regions in this investigation.
7 Consequently, these regions will 
serve as the regional level in the empirical analysis. For further details about the regions, se e 
appendix B.  
An alternative to using media regions would be to use the counties as regions. At least one 
aspect of the counties makes them less appealing to use as regions in this analysis. Since each 
county encompasses fewer municipalities than the media regions, the variables of economic 
conditions are to a very high degree correlated between the municipalities and the county. 
This makes it difficult to estimate responses to both levels with a reasonable degree of 
precision. 
4. Data 
This paper uses a dataset consisting of a panel of 284 out of 290 Swedish municipalities
8, 
covering six general elections from 1985 to 2002.
9 The time period is constrained backwards 
because of lack of unemployment data for municipalities. The fundamental variables needed 
for the regression analysis are election results at the municipality level for the general election 
and measures of economic conditions at the municipality and the regional level. 
The dependent variable is defined as the change in the vote share (since the pr eceding 
election expressed in percentage units) of the governing party or parties. As mentioned above, 
the  Social  Democratic  Party  has  been  ruling  as  a  minority  government  but  has  been 
collaborating with other parties. This makes it difficult to fully asce rtain which parties bear 
the responsibility for the economic policy. Therefore, I will also, as most studies of economic 
voting in Sweden, use the change in the vote share of the governing bloc as the dependent 
variable.
10 
Although there are different ways  of measuring economic conditions, I will follow most 
researchers  in  the  economic  voting  literature  and  use  measures  of  income  growth  and 
unemployment. The variables measured at the municipality level are real growth in the per 
capita tax base
11 and the unemployment rate
12. The measures of unemployment and economic 
growth at the regional level are aggregated from data at the municipality level and calculated 
as  the  averages  of  their  counterparts  in  all  municipalities  in  the  region,  weighted  by 
                                           
7 The nine regions used on average encompass about 32 municipalities and 2.5 counties. 
8 The six newly founded municipalities that have been omitted are (year founded in parentheses): Bollebygd 
(1995), Gnesta (1992), Knivsta (2003), Lekeberg (1995), Nykvarn (1999) and Trosa (1992).  
9 The elections occurred in 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002. 
10 See e.g. Alesina et al. (1997) and Jordahl (2006). The left bloc consists of the Social Democratic Party 
(Socialdemokraterna), the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet). The center -right bloc 
consists of the Moderate Party (Moderaterna), the Center Party (Centerpartiet), the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet), 
the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and the New Democrats (Ny Demokrati). 
11 Change in the tax base is the most commonly used measure of economic growth in Swedish municipalities. 
However, it should be noted that there was as change in the definition of the tax base in conjunction with the tax 
reform of 1991. After the reform, only labor income is included in the tax base measure, while both capital and 
labor incomes were included before the reform. Nevertheless, it is still the best measure available. 
12 This measure is the best available measure of unemployment at the municipali ty level, since it is measured in 
the same way both across municipalities and time. It is calculated as the number of unemployed divided by the 
population aged 16-64, and does therefore not correspond to the unemployment rate traditionally used by labor 
economists, but is more closely connected to the inverse of the employment rate. 8 
 
population. For detailed descriptions of all variables and descriptive statistics, see Appendix 
A. 
5. Empirical investigation 
5.1 Model and empirical strategy 
 
Most estimates in the economic voting literature are based on linear equations specified either 
in  levels  or  changes.
13  Two particular features of this study make a model specified in 
changes preferable. First, one advantage of estimating a first difference equation is that 
covariates that are time invariant cancel out and hence, reduce the potential bias stemming 
from unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Second, the different governments in Sweden 
have been of different sizes since the Social Democratic Party has been ruling as a minority 
government, while the center-right bloc has formed coalition governments consisting of three 
or four parties. By focusing on the changes in the vote share of the incumbent government, 
instead of the level of the support, the fact that the support for left and the cent er-right 
governments has fluctuated around different levels b ecomes less problematic. This latter 
aspect makes a first difference model preferable to a fixed-effects model, which would utilize 
deviations from the mean support of both left and  center-right governments to estimate the 
coefficients. It also makes a random effects model inappropriate to use, since the distribution 
of municipality-specific effects is unlikely to be normally distributed when both left and 
center-right governments are included in the dependent variable. 
While the dataset I use is well suite d for estimating responses to local level economic 
conditions, it is unfortunately not suited for estimating responses to national level economic 
conditions.  The  problem  is  that  with  only  six  elections,  there  are  only  six  different 
observations of macro variables, which leads to a low precision in the estimates. The standard 
errors become large and the estimates become sensitive to unusual values in national level 
variables.  Furthermore,  since  national  level  variables  per  definition  are  constant  across 
municipalities, it is only possible to include a maximum of one macro variable per election in 
the specification. This is troublesome since many factors at the macro level, such as inflation, 
evolution of government debt, election specific issues, candidate effects etc, have been shown 
to affect election outcomes. For such an analysis, either a longer time-series or perceptions of 
economic conditions would be needed.
14 In this case, the most general way of controling for 
macroeconomic conditions is to include ye ar dummies. Wooldridge (2002, p. 129) suggests 
that year dummies should generally be used to account for aggregate changes over time when 
pooled cross sections are analyzed. If any variables at the national level are included in the 
regressions some year dummies need to be dropped. However, it is hard to argue why one 
year dummy should be included but not another. I argue that the best way of controling for 
these factors is to add a full set of year dummies as explanatory variables. Year dummies 
capture the average effect of omitted macro variables and since, by definition, the macro 
variables take the same values for all cross -sectional units, their effect is uniform and hence 
                                           
13 See Nannestad and Paldam (1994). 
14  Veiga and Veiga  (2008) find that macroeconomic variables have a larger influence than local economic 
conditions on voting in Portugal. Johnston and Pattie (2001) find that economic conditions at the regional level 
have a much larger influence than economic conditions at the national level in the United Kingdom. 9 
 
coincides with the average effect. Adding year dummies instead of specific macro variables 
will therefore not bias the estimates of the effects at the municipality and regional level. 
Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of its no longer being possible to include the macro 
variables of interest, i.e. unemployment and growth. While a comparison with the effect of 
national level variables will not be feasible, the effects of municipality and regional level 
variables will not be biased due to the omission of variables at the macro level.  
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where subscript i refers to municipality i, and t to the election at year t. Vi,t hence denotes the 
change in the vote share of the incumbent government from municipality i at election t, since 
the  last  election.  G  refers  to  a  change  in  economic  growth  and  U  to  a  change  in 
unemployment. Superscripts M and R refer to the municipality and regional level. YDt are 
election specific dummies, Z´ is a row vector of time variant covariates, and  is an error term.  
The measures of economic conditions at the regional level are, by construction, correlated 
with  their  counterparts  at  the  municipality  level.  This  can  lead  to  problems  with 
multicollinearity.  Table  1  shows  a  matrix  of  correlation  coefficients  for  changes  in 





  GR  UR  GM  UM 
GR  1.000       
UR  -0.521  1.000     
GM  0.901  -0.459  1.000   
UM  -0.525  0.962  -0.462  1.000 
         
 
As can be seen, the correlations between corresponding measures at the different levels are 
very high, while the correlation between changes in unemployment and growth within each 
level is more modest.
15 When regressors are highly correlated, the estimated  standard errors 
become large as it becomes difficult to know which of the correlated regressors that explain 
the variation in the dependent variable. As a consequence, confidence intervals for the 
parameters in the model tend to be large, which makes it di fficult to obtain reasonable levels 
of precision in hypotheses testing of the model parameters. However, it should be noted that 
although the confidence intervals may be large, the estimated coefficients are still unbiased, as 
long as the model is correctl y specified. Several methods for dealing with problems of 
multicollinearity have been proposed, such as extending the sample,  transforming variables, 
dropping some variables from the model, or using the ridge -regression estimator. Except for 
extending the sample and transforming variables these methods all risk biasing the estimates 
of interest (Greene, 2003, p 56 59). In the words of Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, p. 
102103):  “Collinearity  can  cause  difficulties  for  applied  econometric  work,  but  these 
                                           
15 All correlations are statistically significant at the one-percent level. 10 
 
difficulties are essentially the same as the ones caused by having a sample size that is too 
small”. Even if some regressors are highly correlated, it is possible to obtain estimates that are 
sufficiently precise for our purpose if the sample is sufficiently large, or if the error variance 
of the model is small. However, in presence of other sources of bias
16, multicollinearity may 
aggravate those biases. This type of problem may be present even if the variables of interest 
seem to be precisely estimated.  As a  consequence, I carefully investigate how correlation 
between  the  explanatory  variables  influence s  the  results.  I  do  this  by  testing  for 
multicollinearity  and  by  presenting  results  based  on  different  specifications  −  including 
specifications  in  which  municipality  level  economic  conditions  have  been  transformed  to 
mitigate multicollinearity problems.  I test for multicollinearity by regressing each of the four 
measures of economic conditions on the other three measures and a constant. The baseline 
results in Table 2 show R-squared for these regressions. The R-squares are in all cases high, 
which further indicates that multicollinearity may be a problem in the present application. 
However, problems with multicollinearity can be mitigated by transforming the municipality 
level economic conditions to capture deviations from the corresponding measure at regional 
level.  This  transformation  dramatically  reduces  the  correlation  between  the  explanatory 
variables without introducing new sources of bias. The second row of Table 2 shows R-square 
measures for the multicollinearity tests after transformation of municipality level economic 
conditions. As all R-square measures are much lower after transformation, it indicates that 
this type of transformation is useful for avoiding problems with multicollinearity.
17 In the 
empirical investigation I show results based both on original and on transformed measures of 
municipality economic conditions. 
 
Table 2 
Testing for multicollinearity by examining R
2 from auxiliary regressions 
Dep. Var.  ΔGR  ΔUR  ΔGM  ΔUM 
Baseline  0.831  0.928  0.813  0.927 
After transformation  0.290  0.298  0.018  0.019 
Note: Each of the four columns presents R
2 for a regression in which the specified economic condition is 
regressed on the other three measures plus a constant. In the bottom line measures of municipality level 
economic conditions have been transformed by subtracting the corresponding measure at the regional level. 
 
The municipalities differ in the number of voters. If each municipality is given the same 
weight  in  the  estimations,  the  results  should  be  interpreted  as  the  effect  of  economic 
conditions in the typical municipality. If we are instead interested in how the  typical voter 
reacts, then we need to weight the observations according to the number of voters in each 
municipality.  Since  each  citizen‟s  vote  is  given  equal  weight  in  the  election  and  we  are 
equally interested in the voting behavior of people in all municipalities, it is natural to give 
each  vote  equal  weight  in  the  regressions  as  well.  The  weights  are  calculated  as  each 
municipality‟s share of the number of votes in the election. Thus, larger municipalities will be 
given higher weights than small municipalities. It should be noted that if voting behavior is 
homogeneous across municipalities of different sizes, which is implicitly proposed by the 
empirical specification, the weighted and non-weighted regressions should produce similar 
results. 
                                           
16 Such as for example bias stemming from misspecification of the model. 
17 I thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this method for dealing with the multicollinearity problem. 11 
 
5.2 Basic results 
 
This section presents estimates of the effects of unemployment and growth at the regional and 
municipality level,  based on the model described in  the previous section. The results  are 
derived with the change in the governing parties‟ vote share as the dependent variable. The 
change in economic growth is measured as the difference between the average growth rate 
over the present and the previous term of office. The change in unemployment is calculated in 
the same way. 
Table  3  shows  results  from  six  different  specifications.  In  all  specifications  the 
observations  are  weighted  according  to  the  number  of  voters  in  the  municipality.  As 
previously mentioned, multicollinearity may potentially be a concern. To be able to assess 
whether  multicollinearity  is  a  critical  problem  for  the  analysis,  I  first  include  economic 
conditions at the regional level only, and then municipality level economic conditions only, 
and finally economic conditions at both levels simultaneously. The results are compared with 
each  other.  If  multicollinearity  causes  severe  problems,  I  expect  the  estimates  to  vary 
excessively between regressions and to be imprecisely estimated. 
Column 1 presents the results when only economic conditions at the regional level are 
included in the model and column 2 when only economic conditions at the municipality level 
are  included.  The  results  point  at  substantial  and  statistically  significant  responses  to 
unemployment both at the regional and municipality levels. Growth, both at the regional and 
municipality levels, seem to have small or no effects on the support of the governing parties. 
Given that changes in economic conditions at the two levels are highly correlated, we need to 
be careful in interpreting these coefficients since we cannot yet be confident that they capture 
responses to economic conditions at the intended level only. If economic conditions at both 
levels influence voting in the national elections, we need to include measures of economic 
conditions at both levels simultaneously in order to avoid biasing the parameter estimates. 
This  is  done  in  column  3,  where  economic  conditions  at  both  levels  are  included 
simultaneously. The estimates are quite similar to those in columns 1 and 2, although the 
point estimates indicate slightly smaller responses to unemployment at both the regional and 
the municipal level. The impression of including economic conditions at both levels at the 
same  time  is  that  the  estimates  are  reasonably  stable  and  precisely  estimated.  To  further 
investigate  how  the  results  are  affected  by  the  high  correlation  of  economic  conditions 
between the two levels, I transform the measures of economic conditions at the municipality 
level to capture deviations from the regional level. This procedure dramatically reduces the 
correlations  between  the  different  measures  of  economic  conditions  and  increases  the 
precision of the estimates. Column 4 presents the results based on this transformation. The 
effect of growth at the regional level is virtually unchanged, while the standard errors become 
slightly smaller. Both the effect of unemployment and the precision of the estimate, at the 
regional level, increase as a result of this transformation. At the municipality level both the 




Local level economic conditions and government support  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dep. Var.  Gov  Gov  Gov  Gov  Gov  Gov 
             
ΔGR  0.162    0.161  0.162  0.382  0.255 
  (0.226)    (0.237)  (0.228)  (0.251)  (0.234) 
ΔUR  -1.660***    -1.230***  -1.658***  -1.711***  -1.625*** 
  (0.412)    (0.474)  (0.417)  (0.339)  (0.397) 
ΔGM    0.0301  0.00146       
    (0.0536)  (0.0532)       
ΔUM    -0.623***  -0.428***       
    (0.0884)  (0.105)       
ΔGM (transformed)        0.00146  0.00222  -0.0172 
        (0.0532)  (0.0388)  (0.0358) 
ΔUM (transformed)        -0.428***  -0.427***  -0.361*** 
        (0.105)  (0.118)  (0.117) 
ΔGRSame inc.            -0.245*** 
            (0.0888) 
ΔURSame inc.            0.0533 
            (0.0515) 
ΔGMSame inc.            -0.00408 
            (0.140) 
ΔUMSame inc.            -0.107 
            (0.195) 
Same incumbent            0.102 
            (0.255) 
Δforeign          0.254*  0.209 
          (0.137)  (0.138) 
Δold          -0.275***  -0.269** 
          (0.100)  (0.105) 
Δyoung          -0.336*  -0.386** 
          (0.174)  (0.187) 
Δwomen          114.3***  125.1*** 
          (28.80)  (28.71) 
Δpopulation          -0.0173  -0.0373* 
          (0.0188)  (0.0225) 
Δtax          0.00232  -0.0185 
          (0.0919)  (0.0982) 
Δgrants          0.00005  0.00005 
          (0.00004)  (0.00004) 
Y1985  -0.425  -0.559**  -0.423  -0.423  -1.234  -0.563 
  (0.955)  (0.238)  (0.973)  (0.973)  (0.969)  (0.903) 
Y1988  -3.333***  -2.020***  -3.335***  -3.335***  -4.098***  -3.377*** 
  (0.410)  (0.253)  (0.409)  (0.409)  (0.449)  (0.442) 
Y1991  -5.763***  -5.602***  -5.759***  -5.759***  -5.487***  -5.692*** 
  (0.473)  (0.172)  (0.483)  (0.483)  (0.436)  (0.366) 
Y1994  4.276*  -1.876***  4.263*  4.263*  5.344***  4.358** 
  (2.191)  (0.692)  (2.226)  (2.226)  (1.702)  (2.101) 
Y1998  -9.998***  -9.051***  -9.997***  -9.997***  -10.50***  -9.903*** 
  (0.606)  (0.207)  (0.614)  (0.614)  (0.757)  (0.706) 
Y2002  -1.307  1.830***  -1.299  -1.299  -1.644**  -1.057 
  (0.943)  (0.330)  (0.950)  (0.950)  (0.712)  (0.835) 
Constant  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Elections  6  6  6  6  6  6 
Weighted LS   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1704  1692  1692  1692  1622  1622 
Adj. R
2  0.89  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90 
Note: Observations weighted by number of voters. Standard errors clustered on municipalities in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. U and G refer to unemployment and growth, 
subscripts M and R to municipality and region. 
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So far, we have been able to control for common election specific effects and municipality 
fixed  effects.  To  ensure  that  our  estimates  are  not  biased  due  to  omitted  time  variant 
characteristics of the municipalities, we add seven control variables, capturing changes in 
demographic structure, taxes, and grants received from the central government, in column 5. 
Demographic variables are commonly used to predict party choice rather than government 
support and therefore, all five demographic variables and the change in local tax rate are 
multiplied by minus one for the 1994 election when there was a center-right government. 
Adding these variables does not lead to any significant changes in the estimates of interest 
from column 4. The effect of growth at the regional level increases somewhat but remains 
statistically insignificant. However, we note that increasing shares of foreign and women (old 
and young) are associated with an increase (decrease) in support for the Social Democratic 
Party. Changes in taxes and grants show no statistically significant effects on government 
support.  Although  excluding  or  including  these  variables  only  marginally  affects  the 
coefficients of interest in this paper, I choose to include them in subsequent specifications as 
well. At this point, we can be reasonably confident that bias stemming from omitted variables 
is not seriously confounding our results.
18 
In column 6, I investigate whether voters punish or reward the national incumbent for local 
economic conditions, depending on whether the municipality government is of the same type 
as the national government. For example, if local economic conditions are improving and the 
Social Democrats are incumbents both at the national and the municipality level,  then some 
voters could conclude that policies by the Social Democrats are beneficial for their 
municipality or region. If the municipality and national governments are of different types, it 
may be less clear what type of policy has caused the economic ou tcomes. The results are 
obtained by interacting all economic conditions with a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the local incumbent belongs to the same  political bloc as the national incumbent. The 
results point to a slightly smaller response to e conomic growth  at the regional level  in 
municipalities where the incumbent belongs to the same political bloc as the national 
government. However, we still do not know whether any voters really respond to economic 
growth at all.  These results indicate that when voting in the national election, citizens may 
only to a limited extent condition their responses to local economic conditions on whether the 
municipality government is of the same type as the national government. 
Taken together, these results indicate that voters respond to unemployment at  both the 
regional and municipality levels. What do these results say about the importance of local 
economic circumstances for voting behavior? The results from column 5 imply that at the 
regional  and  municipality  levels,  a  one  percentage  point  decrease  in  unemployment  is 
associated with 1.71 and 0.43 percentage points higher support for the incumbent government, 
respectively. While growth at the municipality level does not seem to have any influence on 
central government support, a one percentage point increase in regional growth is associated 
with a 0.38 percentage points increase in support (although statistically insignificant). Are 
these effects substantial? The standard deviation of regional growth and unemployment is 2.8 
and 2.3, respectively. A one percentage point change in unemployment can therefore not be 
                                           
18 At this point we could consider dropping the growth variables from the regressions. I have done that and the 
unemployment coefficients changes only marginally (results available upon request). 14 
 
considered  as  an  unusually  large  change  in  these  variables,  indicating  substantial  voting 
responses to unemployment both at the regional and municipality levels. 
Although  this  dataset  is  not  suited  for  estimating  effects  of  national  level  economic 
conditions, it is nevertheless interesting to relate the effects of local economic conditions to 
the effects of macroeconomic variables. The election year effects in Table 3 suggest that 
changes in national level variables play an important role in explaining voting behavior. The 
year dummies, capturing the effects of changes at the macro level, explain a great deal of the 
variation in the change of government support, indicating that we cannot rule out important 
effects of national-level economic conditions. The largest estimates are found for the election 
in 1998, an election where the Social Democratic Party received the lowest support since the 
introduction of the unicameral system in 1970. 
These dummies, however, do not only capture the effects of economic variables but all 
effects at the national level. This makes it difficult to infer from these estimates that growth 
and unemployment at the national level are important. However, many studies have estimated 
effects of national level economic variables. In their survey of the economic voting literature, 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) conclude that in most studies, a one percentage point decrease 
in unemployment is associated with an increase in government support of between 0.4 and 0.8 
percentage  points,  and  that  growth  measures  sometimes  are  more  and  sometimes  less 
important  than  unemployment.  Markus  (1988)  finds  an  unusually  large  effect  of  real 
disposable  income  per  capita.  A  one  percentage  point  increase  is  associated  with  a  2.3 
percentage point increase in the vote share of incumbent American presidents. However, he 
does not control for changes in unemployment which may explain why the effect of growth 
was unusually high. Jordahl (2006) analyzes Swedish elections between 1985 and 1994 and 
finds  that  a  one  standard  deviation  decrease  in  unemployment  is  associated  with  a  17 
percentage point increase in the probability of voting for the governing bloc, but no or small 
effects of growth. The overall impression, although with some exceptions, is that the effects 
of national level economic variables are of the same order of magnitude as those found at the 
regional  level  here.  It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  the  estimated  effects  of  national  level 
economic variables would change if measures of regional level variables were to be included 
in such analyses. But it seems plausible to believe that the effects of national level variables 
are biased upwards when local level measures are excluded. Together, these results indicate 
that unemployment at local levels may be at least as important for voting behavior as national 
level economic variables. 
 
5.3 Time horizon of voters 
 
So far, we have assumed that voters respond to economic conditions during the full term of 
office.  The  literature  on  political  business  cycles  suggests  that  voters  respond  more  to 
economic conditions closer to the election. Therefore, it might be argued that the regression 
model should be specified with economic variables that give a higher weight to economic 
conditions closer to the elections. As a sensitivity check, I have repeated the analysis with two 
different measures of economic conditions. The results are presented in Table 4. Column 1 is 
reproduced from Table 3, column 5. In column 2, the four measures of economic conditions 
are calculated as differences between the two years preceding the election and the two years 
preceding the previous election. In column 3, only the differences in the economic conditions 15 
 
between  election  years  are  included.  The  results  indicate  that  changes  in  growth,  at  the 
regional level, may be more important closer to the elections. The coefficient increases in size 
and becomes statistically significant. The effect of growth at the municipality level is in all 
three specifications close to zero, but statistically significant at the ten percent level in column 
3.  The  coefficients  for  unemployment  decrease  somewhat  at  both  levels.  Although  some 
differences in size and statistical significance is found between the three specifications, the 




Voters‟ time horizon 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep. Var.  Gov  Gov  Gov 
Time horizon  Full term  Last two years  Election year 
ΔGR  0.382  0.661***  0.540*** 
  (0.251)  (0.120)  (0.0684) 
ΔUR  -1.711***  -1.567***  -1.212*** 
  (0.339)  (0.473)  (0.412) 
ΔGM (transformed)  0.00222  0.0162  0.0322* 
  (0.0388)  (0.0329)  (0.0172) 
ΔUM (transformed)  -0.427***  -0.264***  -0.158* 
  (0.118)  (0.0908)  (0.0932) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  No  No  No 
Elections  6  6  6 
Observations  1622  1624  1624 
Adj. R
2  0.90  0.90  0.90 
Note: Observations weighted by number of voters. Standard errors clustered on municipalities in parentheses. One, two and 
three stars denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. U and G refer to unemployment and growth, 
subscripts M and R to municipality and region. All three specifications include the same set of control variables and year 
dummies as in Table 3, column 5. 
 
5.4 Differences in type of government 
 
An implicit assumption in the empirical investigation so far has been that voters hold the 
parties represented in the government responsible for local economic conditions. Typically, 
studies of economic voting in Sweden analyze how support for the governing bloc depends on 
economic conditions. The reason for treating the Swedish system as a two-party system is that 
the parties within the two blocs tend to cooperate to a large extent. The center-right bloc has 
formed coalition governments where almost the entire bloc has been included.
19 The Social 
Democratic Party, on the other hand, has ruled as a minority government and has therefore 
been forced to seek support from other parties. During the period covered in this study, the 
Social Democratic Party has cooperated intensively with the Left Party and for extended 
periods also with the Green Party and the Center Party. Thus, it is possible that voters do not 
only hold the Social Democratic Party responsible for the economic conditions but also the 
cooperating parties. As a consequence, it may be motivated to treat the Swedish system a s a 
two-party system and investigate changes in the support of the governing bloc. 
On the other hand, it could also be the case that not even all parties within the government, 
but only the largest party, is held responsible for economic conditions. For th e time period 
                                           
19 In 1991 to 1994, the New Democrats (Ny Demokrati) were represented in parliament and gave their support to 
the center-right bloc, but they were not included in the government. 16 
 
under study, only one government has consisted of more than one party (the  center-right 
government that ruled from 1991 to 1994), thus making it difficult to test with a reasonable 
degree of certainty whether such a conjecture is supported. By comparing the results obtained 
with  four  alternative  dependent  variables,  we  may  nevertheless  obtain  some  tentative 
indications of how voters punish and reward leading parties. 
Table 5 displays such results. Column 1 is reproduced from Table 3, column 5, to facilitate 
the comparison. Column 2 shows the results when the whole bloc is included in the dependent 
variable. The main difference between column 1 and 2 is at the municipality level. Although 
still  small  the  effect  of  growth  becomes  statistically  significant  and  the  effect  of 
unemployment  is  smaller  and  statistically  insignificant.  During  1991  to  1994,  the  New 
Democrats, a party of discontent, supported the center-right government. This party was the 
only center-right party that was not part of the coalition government. The party was founded 
in 1991 and received 6.7 percent of the votes in 1991. In 1994, however, they received only 
1.4 percent of the votes and virtually disappeared from the national political arena. The drop 
in support for the center-right bloc, in 1994, is therefore roughly 12 percentage points if the 
New Democrats are included and only about 6 percentage points if they are excluded. In 
column 3, the New Democrats have been excluded from the center-right bloc, resulting in 
estimates that are more similar to those in column 1.  The main difference is that the effect of 
growth is statistically significant at both levels. In column 4, we instead restrict the dependent 
variable to only include the largest party in the government. The results are very similar to 
those in column 1. Comparing the four specifications indicates that the qualitative conclusions 
do not depend on how the dependent variable is defined. The overall impression is that also 
parties  supporting  the  government  are  held  responsible  for  economic  conditions,  but  we 
cannot  say  if  they  are  held  responsible  to  the  same  degree  as  the  largest  party  or  those 
represented in the government.
20 
   
                                           
20  It  would  be  interesting  to  also  analyze  whether  responses  are  heterogeneous  for  left  and  center-right 
governments as suggested by the clientele hypothesis (Rattinger, 1980), the salient goal hypothesis (Powell and 
Whitten, 1993), or by variations in demand for social insurance (Markussen, 2008). We have only one center-
right government in the sample which also differs in that this government was a majority coalition government, 
while  the  others  have  been  single-party  minority  governments.  Furthermore,  Sweden  experienced  a  severe 
economic downturn during this period, making it very hard to disentangle causes of potential heterogeneity. 
Such an analysis is therefore not meaningful with the current data. 17 
 
Table 5 
Robustness with respect to governing bloc or party as dependent variable? 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dep. Var.  ΔGov  ΔBloc (alt 1)  ΔBloc (alt 2)  ΔBiggest party 
ΔGR  0.382  0.248  0.491**  0.276 
  (0.251)  (0.186)  (0.204)  (0.279) 
ΔUR  -1.711***  -1.792***  -1.598***  -1.232*** 
  (0.339)  (0.463)  (0.491)  (0.204) 
ΔGM (transformed)  0.00222  0.145***  0.109***  -0.0953 
  (0.0388)  (0.0368)  (0.0331)  (0.0840) 
ΔUM (transformed)  -0.427***  -0.142  -0.265***  -0.324*** 
  (0.118)  (0.0949)  (0.0943)  (0.0656) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  No  No  No  No 
Elections  6  6  6  6 
Observations  1622  1622  1622  1622 
Adj. R
2  0.90  0.91  0.83  0.90 
Notes: Observations weighted by number of voters. Alt 1 includes the New Democrats in the right-wing bloc. Alt 2 excludes 
the New Democrats from the center-right bloc. Standard errors clustered on municipalities in parentheses. One, two and three 
stars denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. U and G refer to unemployment and growth, subscripts M 
and R to municipality and region. All four specifications include the same set of control variables and year dummies as in 
Table 3, column 5 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Empirical  studies  of  economic  voting  have  traditionally  not  included  local  economic 
conditions  in  their analyses.  Johnston and Pattie (2001) questioned this  methodology and 
showed that in the British General Election in 1997, voters responded strongly to economic 
conditions in “their part” of Britain. Furthermore, empirical studies related to the literature on 
tactical redistribution have shown that citizens respond to central government spending in 
local districts and municipalities (Levitt and Snyder, 1997 and Jordahl, 2002). 
Using data covering six elections, this paper has improved the understanding of how voters 
respond to local economic conditions by estimating responses to the most commonly used 
measures of economic conditions, viz. economic growth and unemployment. The empirical 
investigation points to substantial responses to changes in unemployment at the regional level. 
The  estimated  responses  to  growth,  at  the  regional  level,  are  substantial  in  size,  but 
statistically  insignificant  in  most  specifications.  The  preferred  specification  suggests  that 
increasing regional growth or reducing regional unemployment by one percentage point is 
associated with an increase in the vote share for the government by 0.38 and 1.71 percentage 
points, respectively, from voters in that region. The effect of unemployment is lower at the 
municipality level than at the regional level, but it is still statistically significant in most 
specifications, while the effect of growth is close to zero. One possible, although speculative, 
explanation for the small responses to municipality-level economic conditions could be that 
voters consider the local governments to be responsible for growth and unemployment in the 
municipalities. 
Exposing the results to various robustness tests does not change the overall picture that 
voters seem to respond to changes in unemployment at both the regional and municipality 
level and that voters may also, to some degree, respond to changes in growth at the regional 
level.  18 
 
Together the results indicate that local economic conditions are of importance for how 
citizens vote and may be fruitfully included in empirical voting equations. If measures of local 
economic  conditions  are  omitted,  then  estimates  of  other  variables  may  be  biased  and 
misleading. This paper also shows that voters do not only respond to local spending by the 
central  government,  but  also  to  traditional  measures  of  economic  outcomes.  This  further 
justifies the assumption in models of political behavior that voters are sensitive to local levels 
of economic conditions. 
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Appendix A: Description of data 
 
Gov: The change in the vote share of the parties forming the government. For example, at 
the election in 1994, it is calculated as the total vote share of the four center-right parties 
forming the coalition government 1991 to 1994 at the election in 1994 minus the total vote 
share of the same parties at the election in 1991. In the 1994 election, this variable consists of 
the  Moderate  Party,  the  Center  Party,  the  Liberal  Party,  and  the  Christian  Democrats 
(Kristdemokraterna)  and  in  all  other  elections  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party 
(Socialdemokraterna). Unit: percentage points. Source: www.scb.se.  
 
Bloc: The change in the vote share of the governing bloc. For example, at the election in 
1994 it is calculated as the total vote share of the five center-right parties in 1994 minus the 
total vote share of the same parties at the election in 1991. The left bloc is defined as the 
Social Democratic Party, the  Left Party, and the  Green Party and it is  being used at  the 
elections in 1985, 1988, 1991, 1998 and 2002. The center-right bloc is defined as consisting 
of the Moderate Party, the Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats, and 
the New Democrats (Ny demokrati) and is being used at the elections in 1982 and 1994. Unit: 
percentage points. Source: www.scb.se. 
 
UM: The change in the mean unemployment rate between two elections. For example, at the 
election in 2002, it is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the unemployment rate for 1999, 
2000, 2001, and 2002, minus the mean unemployment for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. The 
unemployment rate is calculated as the number of unemployed divided by the population aged 
1664.
 Unit: Percentage points. Source: www.ams.se. 
 
GM: The change in the mean of the growth rate of the tax base in the municipality between 
two elections. For example, at the election in 2002, it is calculated as the geometric mean of 
the tax base for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, minus the tax base for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 
1998. The tax base is deflated by CPI. Unit: Percentage points. Source: www.scb.se. 
 
UR: The change in the weighted mean of ΔUM of all municipalities in each region. The 
weights are proportional to the municipalities‟ share of the population in the region. Unit: 
Percentage points. 
 
GR:  The  weighted  mean  of  ΔUM  of  all  municipalities  in  each  region.  The  weights  are 
proportional to the municipalities‟ share of the population in the region. Unit: Percentage 
points. 
 
UM (transformed): UM (transformed) = UM-UR. 
 
GM (transformed): GM (transformed) = GM-GR. 
 
foreign: The change in the fraction of foreign citizens since the last election year in each 
municipality. Unit: Percentage points. Source: www.scb.se. 
 
old: The change in the fraction of people aged 65 or older since the last election year in each 
municipality. Unit: Percentage points. Source: www.scb.se. 
 
young: The change in the fraction of people aged 18 or younger since the last election year 
in each municipality. Unit: Percentage points. Source: www.scb.se. 20 
 
 
women:  The  change  in  the  fraction  of  women  since  the  last  election  year  in  each 
municipality. Unit: Percentage points. Source: www.scb.se. 
 
population:  The  change  in  municipality  population  since  the  last  election  year.  Unit: 
citizens. Source: www.scb.se. 
 
tax: The change in the local tax rate since the last election year. Unit: Percentage points. 
Source: Statistics Sweden. 
 
grants: The change in grants from the central government since the last election year. Unit:  




Summary statistics by election 
Variable  Year  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
             
Gov  1985  284  -0.49  1.08  -4.09  2.77 
GR  1985  284  3.72  0.32  3.20  4.37 
UR  1985  284  0.61  0.25  -0.16  0.98 
GM  1985  284  4.13  1.34  -3.95  13.75 
UM  1985  279  -0.51  0.72  -5.83  2.93 
             
Gov  1988  284  -0.66  1.43  -5.16  2.79 
GR  1988  284  3.02  0.64  2.15  4.14 
UR  1988  284  -0.93  0.21  -1.19  -0.41 
GM  1988  284  2.50  1.64  -13.45  9.62 
UM  1988  278  -1.01  0.57  -3.22  0.27 
             
Gov  1991  284  -5.43  1.66  -10.68  0.01 
GR  1991  284  -2.04  0.68  -2.73  -0.93 
UR  1991  284  -0.51  0.29  -0.89  -0.03 
GM  1991  284  -1.78  1.20  -6.94  2.33 
UM  1991  284  -0.53  0.55  -2.90  0.92 
             
Gov  1994  284  -5.77  2.04  -11.28  8.10 
GR  1994  284  -2.41  0.26  -2.93  -2.10 
UR  1994  284  5.67  0.29  5.20  6.13 
GM  1994  284  -2.34  1.14  -5.60  2.65 
UM  1994  284  5.46  1.09  1.69  7.98 
             
Gov  1998  284  -8.68  2.52  -17.73  -2.70 
GR  1998  284  2.90  0.27  2.41  3.24 
UR  1998  284  -0.53  0.24  -0.91  -0.19 
GM  1998  284  2.85  0.80  -0.06  6.27 
UM  1998  284  -0.61  0.76  -2.78  1.95 
             
Gov  2002  284  3.61  2.07  -8.22  8.78 
GR  2002  284  1.67  0.30  1.32  2.30 
UR  2002  284  -2.76  0.15  -3.01  -2.51 
GM  2002  284  1.41  0.74  -1.12  3.56 
UM  2002  284  -2.68  0.81  -5.25  0.80 
Note: Changes in economic growth and unemployment measures are based on full-term averages. 
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Appendix B: Description of regions 
 
Table B1 
Description of regions 
Region  Number of municipalities  Population (1990) 
Nordnytt region  29  515,703 
Mittnytt region  15  396,881 
Gävledala region  25  578,361 
Tvärsnytt region  38  814,110 
ABC region (Capital)  34  1,910,504 
Östnytt region  23  715,755 
Västnytt region  55  1,712,891 
Smålandsnytt region  33  727,274 
Sydnytt region  38  1,219,151 
 
Fig. 1. Map of regions. Source: Statistics Sweden. 
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